Battleships of the coast defense of France (1855-1922)
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Battleships of the coast defense of France (1855-1922)
19.99 €
The evolution of the ludicrous branch of the French coastal defense ship began with the successful actions of French battleships in suppressing the fortress of Kinburn during the Crimean War.
France, guided, in accordance with the doctrines of the "Young School", fear of large displacements, was the only one who systematically built coastal defense battleships, gradually increasing their displacement. About these second-rate warships with limited naval qualities exhaustively expressed Admiral R. Daveluyi in his book "Maritime Strategy": "They are only floating artillery installations of huge price, expensive maintenance and vulnerability much greater than shore batteries. The advantage offered by the ability to move is nothing more than an illusion: if a ship leaves the skerries, it will get far away from land fortifications and concentrate the fire of all enemy ships on itself, thus exposing itself to rapid disablement, and its propeller is needed only to return to port." The same fears were dictated by the American-built "monitors", however, they quickly realized the uselessness of this kind of construction and were only happy to "spikhuhl" two of them to France. Vaguely defined purpose of ships of this class led to the fact that they were disarmed, and then, with very few exceptions, withdrawn from the fleet before the First World War. The last ship designed under this utterly absurd "coastal defense" concept was Henri IV, but, given strong mine protection and an almost 9,000-ton displacement, it was fairly quickly reclassified as a squadron battleship. About the controversial class of French "coastal defense" this book, richly illustrated with photographs, diagrams and drawings.
France, guided, in accordance with the doctrines of the "Young School", fear of large displacements, was the only one who systematically built coastal defense battleships, gradually increasing their displacement. About these second-rate warships with limited naval qualities exhaustively expressed Admiral R. Daveluyi in his book "Maritime Strategy": "They are only floating artillery installations of huge price, expensive maintenance and vulnerability much greater than shore batteries. The advantage offered by the ability to move is nothing more than an illusion: if a ship leaves the skerries, it will get far away from land fortifications and concentrate the fire of all enemy ships on itself, thus exposing itself to rapid disablement, and its propeller is needed only to return to port." The same fears were dictated by the American-built "monitors", however, they quickly realized the uselessness of this kind of construction and were only happy to "spikhuhl" two of them to France. Vaguely defined purpose of ships of this class led to the fact that they were disarmed, and then, with very few exceptions, withdrawn from the fleet before the First World War. The last ship designed under this utterly absurd "coastal defense" concept was Henri IV, but, given strong mine protection and an almost 9,000-ton displacement, it was fairly quickly reclassified as a squadron battleship. About the controversial class of French "coastal defense" this book, richly illustrated with photographs, diagrams and drawings.
See also:
- All books by the publisher
- All books in the series The warships of the world